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Increasingly, a small number of low-wage countries such as China and India are involved in
innovation -- not `big ideas' innovation, but the constant incremental innovations needed to stay
ahead in business. We provide some evidence of this new phenomenon and develop a model in
which  there  is  a  transition  from  old-style  product-cycle  trade  to  trade  involving  incremental
innovation in low-wage countries. We explain why levels of involvement in innovation vary across
low-wage countries and even across firms within each low-wage country. We then draw out
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When the auto parts giant Delphi Technologies ﬁrst set up shop in Chihuahua, no one
predicted that the Mexican shop-ﬂoor engineers at this low-wage affair would soon be
introducing minor product changes that would slash product failure rates. While the
cumulative effects of these product changes are large, no single innovation is pathbreak-
ing. Even the most sophisticated innovations — those that actually generate patents —
are just better mouse traps that incrementally improve on existing auto parts technology.
For example, most Delphi-Chihuahua patents improve on the control systems of minor
moving parts. These patents are examples of incremental innovation, Rosenberg’s (1982)
unsung hero of modern economic growth. This paper is about the rise of incremental
innovation in some low-wage countries and how it is revolutionizing the ability of these
countries to export high-quality and increasingly sophisticated manufactured goods.
In an attempt to track incremental innovation in low-wage countries we have turned
to the us patent database. For each patent the database lists whether the patent is owned
by a us entity (such as Michigan-based Delphi) and whether any of the inventors reside
in a low-wage country. The top left panel of ﬁgure 1 tracks those patents with at least one
Chinese inventor. The solid line gives the absolute number of such patents and the bars
express this number as a percentage of all us-owned patents. Three features stand out. (1)
In recent years there has been an explosion of us-owned patents involving Chinese and
Indian inventors. This reﬂects the increasing role played by these low-wage countries in
developing incremental innovations for us corporations. (2) In contrast, Thailand (and
many other low-wage countries) have barely been touched by this tide of incremental
innovation. (3) Since 2002, patenting has plateaued in Mexico (and some other popular
fdi destinations in Eastern Europe and Latin America) as companies such as Delphi have
shifted production to China.
Incremental innovation in low-wage countries is not part of the lexicon of international
trade. Instead, we are glued to Vernon’s (1966) product-cycle theory in which products

































































































































































Bars (left-hand scale) indicate the percentage of us-owned patents with at least one inventor who is a resident of the indicated country. 
Lines (right-hand scale) indicate the total number of us-owned patents with at least one inventor who is a resident of the indicated country. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the United States Patent and Trademark Office website (http://www.uspto.gov/).
Notes:
Figure 1. Share of us-Owned Patents with a Foreign Inventor
offshore to low-wage countries. (See also Krugman, 1979, and the more sophisticated
approach of Antràs, 2005.) Grossman and Helpman (1991b,c) allow for active knowledge
acquisition in low-wage countries. However, this is imitation rather than the incremental
innovation of ﬁgure 1. To advance beyond the product cycle, we provide a general
equilibrium theory of the determinants and implications of incremental innovation in
low-wage countries. The theory is centred on a ﬁrm’s decision to involve local agents
in innovation.
One beneﬁt of local involvement is that it allows ﬁrms to locate production in a low-
wage country even before products and processes are fully developed and standardized:
local engineers are used to help complete the process of standardization. Thus, for ex-
2ample, 3com’s 8800 high-end network switch and Nokia’s 6108 handset were ﬁrst pro-
duced in China with substantial design done locally. Such local involvement can reduce
innovation costs as well as production costs at early stages of the product-cycle. A second
beneﬁt is that in a world of complex foreign supply chains, a ﬁrm that involves local
suppliers in incremental innovation can insist that each supplier deliver continual product
and process upgrades. Being directly engaged in the production process, suppliers can
come up with improvements on the shop ﬂoor that would have been very difﬁcult for
the ﬁrm to identify from the outside. These additional improvements allow ﬁrms such as
Delphi to stay a hair’s breadth ahead of the competition.
Against these beneﬁts are some big negatives of involving local agents in incremental
innovation. First, the agent’s ideas are necessarily different from those of the ﬁrm. While
differences in ideas are partly a positive in that they allow the ﬁrm to exploit additional
improvements, they are also partly a negative. In particular, local agents typically supply
parts or components for complex, interdependent systems in which an incremental im-
provement in one component is not effective unless other components are also modiﬁed.
This interdependence means that a parts supplier does not internalize all of the ﬁrm’s
innovation costs. In the simplest case, when a ﬁrm asks a parts supplier to improve a
component, thesolutionwillusuallyentailresidualincompatibilitieswithothercomponents
of the system, thus forcing the ﬁrm to incur the additional expense of bringing other
components into line. There is a second more familiar cost of involving local components
suppliers in incremental innovation. Once the ﬁrm involves the local agent in incremental
innovation, the agent acquires information and expertise which can be used outside the
relationship. This raises the agent’s outside option. Therefore, local agents who are
involved in an incremental innovation must be paid more. This earnings premium is a
cost and the ﬁrm must decide if it is justiﬁed by the beneﬁts of involving the local agent
in incremental innovation.
These costs and beneﬁts of involving local agents in incremental innovation give rise
to our theory of when and why product-cycle trade is replaced by trade involving in-
3cremental innovation in some low-wage countries. The theory uses the twin concepts of
residual incompatibilities and earnings premia to predict which low-wage countries will
be involved in incremental innovation and at what level of intensity. The theory embeds
the above logic of a single ﬁrm and a single local agent into a general equilibrium model of
world trade in which incremental innovation drives comparative advantage. This allows
us to explain the three features of ﬁgure 1 listed above. It also allows us to explain recent
developments in international trade that have coincided with the rise of China and India.
In particular, while most trade involving countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and
Thailand continues to be product-cycle trade, other countries such as China and India are
slowly moving towards trade that embodies local incremental innovation. As noted by
Sutton (2001, 2004), this innovation is crucial for understanding the exporting success of
China and India.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of the introduction provides a
literature review as well as a concrete example of residual incompatibilities. Sections
2–3 describe the ﬁrm’s problem while sections 4–5 set this problem within a general
equilibrium model in order to discuss international trade issues.
Related literature
This paper has many touchstones with the existing international trade literature. Ver-
non’s (1966) product-cycle model and its dynamic Ricardian variants (e.g., Krugman,
1979, Grossman and Helpman, 1991b,c, and Antràs, 2005) either assume or predict that
innovation occurs exclusively in rich countries. They rule out innovation in low-wage
countries. In the absence of local innovation, technologies diffuse to low-wage countries
via such channels as imported machinery, fdi, scientiﬁc journals, technology licensing and
theft (Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Markusen, 2002). A few papers (e.g., Grossman
and Helpman, 1991b,c) allow agents in low-wage countries to actively invest in acquiring
knowledge. However, this knowledge acquisition is just reverse engineering of products
originally developed in rich countries.
4Our paper also ﬁts into the literature on incomplete contracts and trade. However, in
order to focus on our novel contribution we sidestep the two most important questions
addressed by the literature. The ﬁrst is about the choice between vertical integration and
outsourcing in general equilibrium (e.g., McLaren, 2000, Grossman and Helpman, 2002,
2003, Antràs, 2003). The second is about the choice between sourcing inputs from the
North or from the South (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2005). Several papers combine
both questions in order to deal with the choice between integrated home production,
domestic outsourcing, fdi, and offshore outsourcing, or some subset of these (e.g., Antràs
and Helpman, 2004, Grossman and Helpman, 2004, and also Antràs, 2005, who integrates
this choice in a product-cycle model). Spencer (2005) and Treﬂer (2005) review this lit-
erature. We do not tackle these questions, choosing instead to focus on the conditions
that promote incremental innovation in low-wage countries. Our starting point is that a
Northern ﬁrm has already decided to locate production in the South. We model the ﬁrm’s
choices about (i) which of several low-wage countries to enter, (ii) whether to involve a
local agent in incremental innovation, and if so, (iii) whether to delegate control of incre-
mental innovation decisions to the local agent. Notice that we are silent on whether we
are dealing with fdi or offshore outsourcing. What matters to us is whether incremental
innovation is being done and who controls it.
Our paper is also related to work on contract enforcement and trade. See the seminal
work of Ethier and Markusen (1996) as well as Markusen (2002) and Nunn (2005). Weak
contract enforcement is one of several possible sources of the earnings premium discussed
above. Ethier and Markusen (1996) are interested in the choice between exporting and
producing abroad. Producing abroad allows the ﬁrm to beneﬁt from lower wages, but at
a cost: it also allows the local agent to passively absorb the ﬁrm’s technology and steal it.
This is an important insight. In contrast, we are interested in active participation of local
agents in incremental innovation.
Finally, our paper builds on Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) discussion of formal versus
real authority inside a ﬁrm. In their framework, an agent who is sufﬁciently better
5informed may have real authority despite not having formal authority inside a ﬁrm. The
principal may retain her authority by gathering better information, but the threat of being
overruled by the principal will stiﬂe the agent’s initiative. When applied to incremental
innovation, this suggests that the intensity of innovation can be increased by delegating
control of innovation decisions to an agent. Puga and Treﬂer (2002) develop this insight in
a closed-economy, partial equilibrium model of the internal organization of the ﬁrm. They
use this model to explain changes in the organization of Sony’s cathode ray tube (crt)
production arrangements in the United States in 1997 and Boeing’s decision to change
its management structure and relocate its corporate headquarter to a city where it had
no production facilities in 2001. Marin and Verdier (2002) use the Aghion and Tirole
framework to discuss the impact of reduced proﬁt margins on the allocation of power
inside ﬁrms. Marin and Verdier (2003) combine this with trade-induced changes in factor
prices to predict a cross-country convergence to ﬂatter corporate hierarchies.
Residual incompatibilities: An example
Residual incompatibility is a core concept for what follows. It is a measure of the costs
imposed on one party (the principal or agent) by the innovative efforts of the other party
(the agent or principal). To illustrate the role of residual incompatibilities, consider the
key component of a television, namely, the cathode ray tube (crt).1 A crt is basically an
electron gun aimed at the phosphor-coated front screen of a glass vacuum tube (see ﬁgure
2). In the early 1990s, rising consumer preferences for ﬂatter screens created a tension
between electron-gun manufacturers such as Sony and vacuum tube manufacturers such
asAsahiGlass. ThestartingpointforAsahiGlassisthatdomesarebetterthanﬂatsurfaces
at withstanding the implosion forces of the vacuum tube. Asahi would thus prefer the
solution for a ﬂat-screen crt illustrated in ﬁgure 2, in which the crt screen is ﬂat from the
viewer’s perspective, but domed from the electron gun’s perspective. This is far simpler
from a glass manufacturer’s point of view than increasing the physical strength of the
glass. Sony would prefer a ﬂat screen from the perspective of both the viewer and the
1This example is discussed in more detail in the context of Puga and Treﬂer’s (2002) analysis of changes
in the organization of Sony’s crt production in 1997.
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Figure 2. Section of a cathode ray tube
gun because the variable thickness of the glass creates a prism effect that reduces the
sharpness of the picture. This distortion can only be remedied by modifying the electron
gun. However, unless it designs the vacuum tube itself, Sony does not know the extent to
which differences in glass thickness can be safely reduced and at what cost (see us patent
6,121,723, awarded to Asahi Glass in 2000, for a discussion of how excessively reducing
differences in thickness increases the risk of implosion). Likewise, Asahi does not know
precisely the extent to which modiﬁcations to the electron gun can compensate for the
varying thickness of the glass and at what cost. Asahi does not fully internalize the costs
that its solution imposes on Sony while Sony does not fully internalize the costs that its
solution imposes on Asahi. In our terminology, the solutions of Asahi and Sony create
residual incompatibilities.
2. Set-up
We have in mind a situation in which a us ﬁrm with an existing product that it produces in
China sets out to improve it with an incremental process or product innovation. Changing
market conditions associated with changes in consumer preferences, available techno-
logies, environmental regulations and the evolution of competitors force the us ﬁrm to
7respond by incrementally improving the product or its production process. We refer to
the American ﬁrm as the principal, denoted by ‘she’ or a subscript p. We refer to the
Chinese partner as the agent, denoted by ‘he’ or a subscript a. We are not concerned here
with how the us principal came to have the asset that allows her to produce or why she
has decided to produce abroad. Nor are we concerned here with the mode of entry into
China. For our purposes the Chinese agent is the senior manager/engineer either of an
independent Chinese supplier (offshore outsourcing) or of a us-owned subsidiary (fdi).
Our analysis instead focuses on the extent to which American ﬁrms involve the managers
and engineers of Chinese plants in the innovation process. This will provide the building
blocks for our general equilibrium analysis of incremental innovation and international
trade.
Incremental innovation
Turning to the principal-agent problem, for a product to be improved there must be a
blueprint for incremental innovation. The American principal can develop the blueprint
in the United States and ask the Chinese agent merely to implement it. Alternatively, the
American principal can involve the Chinese agent in developing a blueprint. Developing
blueprints requires ‘innovation’ effort. Let ei be the innovation effort of i (i = p,a) where
ei ∈ [0,1]. Innovation effort level ei leads to the development of one or more blueprints
with probability ei and to no blueprints with probability 1− ei. There are two key advant-
ages of involving the Chinese agent in incremental innovation. First, local involvement
brings fresh ideas to the table, thus increasing the probability of developing a blueprint.
Second, local involvement allows the American ﬁrm to replace some of her innovation
effort with that of her Chinese agent.
There are, however, two disadvantages of involving the Chinese agent in developing
a blueprint. First, as in the Sony-Asahi crt example, a blueprint designed by one party
creates residual incompatibilities for the other party. Resolving these residual incompatib-
ilities requires ‘debugging’ effort by the non-designing party. We assume that the amount
8of debugging effort di that must be exerted by the non-designing party is decreasing in
s where s ∈ (0,1) is a measure of the similarity of American-developed and Chinese-
developed blueprints. (s is for ‘similarity.’) A high value of s captures the notion of low
residual incompatibilities and hence of low levels of debugging effort. We also assume
that debugging effort is decreasing in ei since the larger is ei the more familiar is i with the





0 if i’s blueprint is implemented,
(1− s)(1− ei) if j’s blueprint is implemented,
(1)
For simplicity, we assume that debugging effort is the only characteristic distinguishing
blueprints so that, once successfully developed and debugged, all blueprints yield the
same total proﬁt. For simplicity, any successfully developed and debugged blueprint
allows production of one unit of output with no additional inputs required other than
those provided by the principal and the agent.
In addition to residual incompatibilities, there is a second ‘earnings premium’ disad-
vantage to involving the Chinese agent in developing a blueprint. To develop a blueprint,
the agent needs conﬁdential technical and/or marketing speciﬁcations from the American
ﬁrm. Much of this information will typically be non-codiﬁable information passed on by
us managers and engineers to their Chinese counterparts. This information will almost
certainly be valuable outside the relationship. Thus, once the Chinese agent has this
information, the American principal will have to pay an earnings premium in order to
retain the Chinese agent.
The agent’s opportunities outside the relationship are determined by two components:
an endogenous component that depends on the equilibrium demand for agents and an
exogenous component that depends on the legal protections afforded to the American prin-
cipal. The appendix endogenously models the ﬁrst component. For simplicity, however,
in the main text we only model the second (exogenous) component. We do this as follows.
Due to the public goods nature of knowledge that Arrow (1962) emphasized, when
knowledge is jointly created it is not possible for an outside observer such as a court to
9accurately disentangle the relative contributions of each innovator. Thus, after a blueprint
is developed both the principal and the agent can each reasonably claim to have been the
primary inventor.2 We assume that legal challenges by both the agent and principal are
costlessly available and that in the event of a legal challenge, the court awards an exo-
genous fraction λ of operational proﬁts to the agent and a fraction 1 − λ to the principal.
(Equivalently, one can think of λ as the probability that the court awards all operational
proﬁts to the agent.) Letting π be operational proﬁts, it follows that if the agent is involved
in an incremental innovation then he receives λπ and the principal receives (1− λ)π. For
if the agent receives less than λπ he initiates legal proceedings and if the agent receives
more than λπ the principal initiates legal proceedings.3
Let w be the wage paid to the agent when the agent is not involved in an incremental
innovation, that is, when the agent’s only responsibility is to produce the improved
product using a blueprint developed by the principal. Then income for the agent and





w if a is not involved in blueprint development,
λπ if a is involved in blueprint development,
yp = π − ya .
(2)
We now have in place our twin pillars — residual incompatibilities as modelled by s and
earnings premia as modelled by λπ/w.
Preferences are Cobb-Douglas with equal exponents on consumption and leisure and





2Court challenges aimed at obtaining a higher share of the rents from an innovation than that speciﬁed in
an employment contract are widespread even in the case of major, as opposed to incremental, innovations.
A recent example is the successful court challenge against Toshiba by a former employee who claimed main
responsibility for the invention of ﬂash memory. This is just one of many recent court cases brought by
Japanese and us inventors against their employers. It shows just how prevalent this problem is in rich
countries, let alone in poor countries with weak protection of intellectual property rights.
3The emphasis on contract-enforcement in this context was pioneered by Ethier and Markusen (1996).
10where li is i’s leisure and P is the relevant price index. Both creative effort ei and debug-
ging effort di are costly because they eat into an individual’s unit endowment of leisure.
Leisure for i (i = p,a) is:
li = 1− ei − di . (4)
Sequence of events
We turn now to the sequence of events. The American principal and Chinese agent match,
sign a contract governing their relationship, and begin working together. Initially, the
principal does not invite the agent to participate in knowledge creation. The agent is paid
w to start up what is best described as a product-cycle relationship in which all of the
technology is expected to be developed by the principal in the United States and then
transferred to China for use in production by the Chinese agent. In the course of this
preliminary work the principal and agent learn more about each other and get a clearer
sense of how good the Chinese agent will be at incrementally improving the principal’s
product. That is, the principal and agent learn about the residual incompatibilities or
debugging effort that the principal will bear if the agent develops a blueprint for the incre-
mental innovation. Mathematically, they learn the similarity parameter s. We formalize
this learning process in a stylized way. When the principal and agent match they have
only a broad sense of their similarity. This is described by a prior cumulative distribution
function F(s). After working together they learn s exactly.
If s is close to 0, which is to say that residual incompatibilities are large, the principal
will want to continue a product-cycle type of relationship in which the principal does all
of the incremental innovation. If s is large the principal may want to engage the agent in
designing blueprints. Thus, after learning s both parties may want to amend the contract
so that the agent is paid λπ to be involved in an incremental innovation.4
There are three possible degrees of agent involvement in incremental innovation.
4This sets up the potential for an interesting dynamic which we do not explore. The principal and agent
may wish to start with smaller projects or projects with less uncertainty about s and then, over time, consider
more complex projects.
111. Agent-Uninvolved Innovation (AU): The us principal tries to develop a blueprint in
the United States and, if successful, provides it to the Chinese agent for production.
The Chinese agent does no incremental innovation.
2. Agent-Assisted Innovation (AA): Both the us principal and the Chinese agent try to
develop blueprints. In the event that several blueprints are developed, the principal
decides which blueprint will be used.
3. Agent-Managed Innovation (AM): Both the us principal and the Chinese agent try to
develop blueprints. In the event that several blueprints are developed, the agent
decides which blueprint will be used.
Agent-uninvolved innovation is a product-cycle relationship. Agent-assisted and agent-
managed innovation are the new types of international relationships described in our
introduction e.g., ﬁgure 1.
Even if i and j each independently develop multiple blueprints, j’s preferred blueprint
is by assumption always a blueprint designed by j. Thus, for ﬁxed levels of innovation
effort, the principal prefers agent-assisted to agent-managed innovation. However, the
level of innovation effort is not ﬁxed. As in Aghion and Tirole (1997), letting the agent
choose the blueprint is an incentive device that makes the agent want to exert more in-
novative effort. This will be discussed below where we will show that the agent’s level of
innovation effort is highest under agent-managed innovation, lower under agent-assisted
innovation and nonexistent under agent-uninvolved innovation.
We assume that there are several factors that cause contractual incompleteness. First,
we make the standard assumption that effort is neither observable nor contractible.
Second, we assume that the contract cannot be contingent on any aspect of the blueprint
for incremental innovation. We have previously discussed two reasons for this. (a) The
blueprint is by deﬁnition new knowledge and therefore unknown to the parties at the time
of writing the contract. (b) If the principal and the agent are both involved in innovation,
then the court is unable to disentangle the relative contribution of each. Thus, a contract
12between principal and agent only speciﬁes the type of agent involvement in innovation
(i.e., agent-assisted, agent-managed or agent-uninvolved) and the payment conditional
on production (i.e., w or λπ).5
It may be useful to the reader if we recap this section. The American principal and
Chinese agent match and have a prior F(s) about their similarity parameter s. Initially
they agree on a contract which pays the agent w for starting up a product-cycle rela-
tionship. Once the relationship is started up both parties learn s. If s is large then the
principal offers to amend the contract to allow for agent involvement in incremental in-
novation. In particular, the principal offers the agent λπ in return for either agent-assisted
or agent-managed innovation. The proﬁt share λ is exogenously pinned down by the
court system. If the amended contract is accepted by the agent then the principal and
agent choose their levels of innovation effort ep and ea. Below we ensure that the agent
accepts the contract i.e., that incentive compatibility is satisﬁed. If at least one blueprint
is developed then there is production and the agent is paid (either w or λπ). Otherwise,
there is no production and no payment to the agent.
3. Contributions to incremental innovation
The level of agent involvement in innovation will depend on s and the earnings premium
λπ/w. This section describes exactly how.
Agent-uninvolved innovation (AU)
Agent-uninvolved innovation means that the principal excludes the agent from the in-
cremental innovation process so that the agent cannot possibly claim to have come up
with the crucial ideas. Thus, the agent exerts no innovation effort (ea = 0) and is paid
w conditional on the principal developing a blueprint (i.e., with probability ep). The
5We are assuming that the proﬁt share λ is independent of whether there is agent-assisted or agent-
managed innovation even though agent involvement is speciﬁed in the contract and hence known to the
court. This is easily relaxed to allow for two proﬁts shares, λAA and λAM. However, this leads to only trivial
changes in the model. In particular, the proposition 1 cutoffs s and 1/
√
2 will then depend on λAA and λAM.
Aside from this, nothing else changes.
13principal chooses innovation effort ep to maximize her expected utility. From equations








(1− ep) . (5)
That is, with probability ep the principal develops a blueprint, receives income π − w and
has leisure 1 − ep. With probability 1 − ep there is no blueprint so that income and hence






Since the agent must debug the principal’s blueprint, the agent’s leisure is 1 − ea − da =
1 − (1 − s) = s. Thus, with probability ep the agent receives income w and has leisure s.
With probability 1−ep the principal fails to develop a blueprint so that the agent’s income
and hence utility is 0. The solution to (5) is trivial (ep = 1/2). For future reference, denote
the equilibrium innovation effort levels under agent-uninvolved innovation by
eAU
p = 1/2 and eAU
a = 0 . (7)
Agent-assisted innovation
Under agent-assisted innovation both the principal and the agent work on blueprints
(ep > 0, ea > 0). The principal chooses which blueprint is used and always prefers her
own because this shifts the debugging of residual incompatibilities onto the agent. The








(1− ep) + (1− ep)ea
(1− λ)π
P
(1− ep)s . (8)
That is, with probability ep the principal develops a blueprint, receives income (1 − λ)π
and has leisure 1 − ep. When the principal does not come up with a blueprint, having
asked the agent to assist in innovation means that the agent may succeed where the
principal failed. Thus, with probability (1− ep)ea only the agent develops a blueprint, the
principal receives income (1− λ)π and has leisure (1− ep)s. If no blueprint is developed,








(1− ea)s + (1− ep)ea
λπ
P
(1− ea) . (9)






















Under agent-managed innovation again both the principal and the agent work on blue-
prints (ep > 0, ea > 0). The agent chooses which blueprint is used and always prefers
his own because this shifts the debugging of residual incompatibilities onto the principal.





















(1− ea) + (1− ea)ep
λπ
P
(1− ea)s . (13)























As the Chinese agent becomes more involved in incremental innovation (going from
agent-uninvolved innovation to agent-assisted innovation and then to agent-managed
innovation), the Chinese agent’s innovation effort rises and the American principal’s
innovation effort falls. That is, eAU
p > eAA
p > eAM




The principal is replacing her innovation effort with that of the agent. This is a key beneﬁt
that the principal gets from involving the agent in incremental innovation.
Why does the agent exert more effort under agent-managed innovation than under
agent-assisted innovation? When the agent chooses the blueprint, it is more likely that
the agent’s blueprint will be chosen and hence more likely that the agent will avoid the
costsofdebuggingresidualincompatibilities. Asaresult, agent’sbeneﬁtsfrominnovation
effort are higher under agent-managed innovation than under agent-assisted innovation.
This builds on Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) insight that delegation is an incentive device
that induces innovation effort from the agent in settings where monetary incentives are of
limited effectiveness.7
A second beneﬁt for the American principal from involving the Chinese agent is that
the probability of developing a blueprint is higher when their creative efforts are com-
bined. That is, eAM
a + (1 − eAM
a )eAM
p = eAA
p + (1 − eAA
p )eAA
a > eAU
p . This captures the
idea that local agents can identify potential improvements on the shop ﬂoor that would
have been very difﬁcult for an American ﬁrm to identify from the outside. Thus, their
involvement helps to attain continual product and process upgrades.
6This can be seen from equations (7), (11), and (15) which show that eAU
p = 2−1 > eAA
p = (2 + s)−1 >
eAM
p = (2+ 2s)−1 > 0 and eAM
a = (2+ s)−1 > eAA
a = (2+ 2s)−1 > eAU
a = 0.
7In Aghion and Tirole (1997), monetary incentives are ruled out by the assumption that the agent is
inﬁnitely risk-averse. This strikes us as a very strong assumption. By contrast, in our setting the agent is
risk neutral and does respond to monetary incentives — in fact, we will see shortly that the principal uses
the earnings premium in order to induce the agent to get involved in the innovation process. However,
in our model the principal is limited in the range of monetary incentives that she can offer. Monetary
incentives that leave the agent with less than λπ are unacceptable to the agent and monetary incentives that
leave the agent with more than λπ are unacceptable to the principal. Thus, the principal can offer monetary
incentives in moving from agent-uninvolved to agent-assisted innovation (w < λπ), but once involved in
innovation, the principal can only offer λπ regardless of the agent’s effort level.
16The choice of the agent’s involvement in innovation
The American principal chooses which of three forms to use in involving the Chinese
agent in innovation. We therefore need to know the American principal’s returns from
each form. Plugging in the Nash effort levels of equations (7), (11) and (15) into the
principal’s expected utility functions of equations (5), (8) and (12) yields the following
























We have repeatedly argued that the twin pillars of the principal’s decision are earnings
premia (λπ/w) and residual incompatibilities as captured by the blueprints similarity
parameter (s). To bring this out we multiply through equation (16) by 4P
(1−λ)π. Denoting





















One can see immediately the role of s. Finding λπ
w is just a little trickier. Because we are
looking at the earnings premium from the principal’s perspective, the premium is better
expressed as
(1−λ)π
π−w . But this is just the inverse of VAU
p = 1−w/π
1−λ . Now it is clear that
the earnings premium and residual incompatibilities are the only two factors determining
the principal’s decisions. The American principal will (1) involve the Chinese agent in
innovation if and only if either VAM
p or VAA
p exceeds VAU
p and (2) delegate management

















Notes: AU is agent-uninvolved innovation, AA is agent-assisted innovation and AM is agent-managed innovation.
Figure 3. The principal’s choice over the agent’s involvement in innovation










p for s > 1/
√
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1−2λ+w/π. All of these results follow from exceedingly trivial manipulations of
equation (17). We collect these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Extent of the agent’s involvement in innovation) The principal prefers agent-
assisted to agent-uninvolved innovation if and only if
s > s ≡
2(λ − w/π)
1− 2λ + w/π
. (18)
The principal prefers agent-managed to agent-assisted innovation if and only if s > 1 √
2.
Figure 3 is drawn for the case in which agent-uninvolved, agent-assisted, and agent-
managed innovation are all possible preferred choices for the principal depending on the









2 ' 1.26. Then the principal prefers agent-uninvolved innovation for
s < s, agent-assisted innovation for s < s < 1/
√
2, and agent-managed innovation for
s > 1/
√
2.8 It follows that when s < 1/
√
2, the three ways of organizing innovation can
co-exist. Different matches will have different values of s and hence choose different ways
of organizing innovation. All that is required for coexistence is sufﬁcient heterogeneity in
thecross-matchdistributionof s. Thiswillplayanimportantpartinourdiscussionofwhy
some countries are stuck in product-cycle trade while others have moved to incremental
innovation-based trade. This coexistence of forms has the ﬂavour of Melitz (2003) where
exporters and non-exporters coexist because of cross-plant differences in productivity.
Likewise, Antràs and Helpman (2004) use Melitz’s productivity heterogeneity to generate
the coexistence of integrated home production, domestic outsourcing, fdi and offshore
outsourcing.
While it is the American principal who may offer the Chinese agent some involvement
in innovation, the Chinese agent can always refuse. That is, we need to check that
incentive compatibility is satisﬁed. The following lemma relates incentive compatibility
to the earnings premium.
Lemma 1 (Incentive compatibility) Incentive compatibility holds for all s if and only if the
earnings premium is high enough, λπ
w > 3
2.
Proof See the appendix.
As a ﬁnal comment on the earnings premium, note that we have set up the model
so that innovation effort levels are independent of ﬁrm proﬁts π. This allows us to








2, only agent-uninvolved innovation (for low s) and agent-managed in-
novation (for high s) are possible preferred choices for the principal. Finally, if 1−w/π
1−λ > 3
2 agent-uninvolved
innovation is always preferred by the principal.
19determined at the general equilibrium level.9 General equilibrium feedbacks enter only
via the earnings premium λπ/w and its effect on the threshold level for the similarity-of-
blueprints parameter s. Our parsimonious approach is intended to highlight the key role
of the earnings premium. It will also have the effect of simplifying the analysis of general
equilibrium international trade ﬂows.
4. International trade and incremental innovation
We now turn to the implications or our model for incremental innovation in low-wage
countries as well as for international trade and income disparities. In the previous section
we focused on the decision by a single us ﬁrm about whether and how much to involve
her Chinese partner in incremental innovation. We now consider multiple us ﬁrms or
principals. Let M be the endogenous number of us ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm must choose a
production location from among multiple low-wage countries. For concreteness, let each
principalbeausautodesignerormanufacturerwhohasdecidedtoproduceautoparts(or
autos for short) in a low-wage country. Since we are not interested in the choice between
producing in high-wage versus low-wage countries we assume that all auto production
takesplaceinlow-wagecountries. Forclarityweconsideronlytwolow-wagecountries—
China and Thailand. As will become clear, it requires virtually no change in our analysis
to allow for any ﬁnite number of low-wage agent countries and high-wage principal
countries.
To bring the results into stark relief we allow for only one difference between China
and Thailand. When a principal goes to China, she is less likely to face large residual
incompatibilities. Mathematically, let F be the cumulative distribution function of the s in
China and let F∗ be the corresponding cumulative distribution function in Thailand. Both
9In contrast, Marin and Verdier (2002) set up a general equilibrium version of Aghion and Tirole (1997)
that focuses on the possible effects of changes in ﬁrm proﬁt margins on effort levels, and through them on
the allocation of power inside the ﬁrm. A fall in proﬁt margins increases the loss of market share that a ﬁrm
suffers from implementing a suboptimal project, so the ﬁrm may choose to increase its monitoring effort
while at the same time delegating power to lower levels of management so as not to stiﬂe their initiative.
This is an important insight. However, since it is quite separate from our main interests in this paper, we
have chosen to remove this additional general equilibrium interaction.
20F and F∗ are assumed differentiable. Asterisks will denote Thai variables throughout.
We assume that F ﬁrst-order stochastic dominates F∗. This means that F is right-shifted
relative to F∗: F 6 F∗ for all s, with strict inequality for some s ∈ (0,1). As is well




0 v(s)dF∗(s) for every
nondecreasing function v.
Although we believe the assumption that F ﬁrst-order stochastic dominates F∗ to be the
obvious one, it is worth reviewing the evidence for what the Chinese distribution looks
like relative to countries such as Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. First, relative to
Thai engineers, Chinese engineers receive training that allows them to work more effect-
ively with us engineers. Part of this is the high quality of Chinese engineering schools.
The Times Higher Education Supplement places 2 Chinese engineering schools in the top 15
worldwide and another 6 in the top 100. In contrast, no Thai, Indonesian or Philippine
school makes this list.10 Also, there is a large number of Chinese nationals who graduated
from us engineering schools and moved back to China. Among foreign-born scientist and
engineering students who are enrolled in us schools but have no ﬁrm plans to stay in the
United States, 25% are from China whereas only 1% are from Thailand, Indonesia and the
Philippines combined.11 The large number of Chinese with us engineering degrees makes
it easier to initiate contacts (credentialism) and communicate engineering solutions.
Second, Chinese engineers likely have better speciﬁc industrial training than their
Southeast Asian counterparts. They have been nurtured by the Chinese diaspora in Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore which has invested heavily in bringing Chinese manufac-
turing plants up to snuff. While hard numbers on the impact of the diaspora are hard to
ﬁnd, there is signiﬁcant evidence that Chinese plants are adopting Western management
techniques which emphasize quality control and information ﬂow. This can be seen,
for example, in the prevalence of iso 9001 certiﬁcates, a standard reference for quality
management practices in business-to-business dealings. As of December 2003, China
10Rankings are published in Times Higher Education Supplement, 5 November 2004, available at http:
//www.thes.co.uk/worldrankings/.
11Authors’ calculations based on data in Johnson (1998) and http://sestat.nsf.gov.
21had a stock of almost 100,000 iso 9001 certiﬁcates compared to only 3,449 for Thailand,
Indonesia and the Philippines combined.12
Third, China is a major fdi destination for us ﬁrms not just because of its low-wages,




an attractive place to locate ﬁrst production — proximity to discerning consumers is a key
driver of Vernon’s argument for why innovation occurs in rich countries.
For these three reasons it is appropriate to assume that F ﬁrst order stochastic domin-
ates F∗. Note that all three reasons apply almost as much to India as they do to China.
Returning to the model, each principal makes her location choice knowing the distri-
bution of s she will encounter in China and in Thailand. However, it is only after she has
made her location choice and started working with a particular agent that she learns the
value of s associated with working with that agent i.e., she learns the cost of sorting out
residual incompatibilities. Thus, in deciding whether to locate in China or in Thailand
each principal takes expectations over s. Similarly, in deciding whether to become an
agent in the auto sector or to engage in an as-yet unmodelled alternative occupation, each
agent must take expectations over s. Notice that we have focused our analysis on the
case in which agent-uninvolved, agent-assisted, and agent managed innovation are all
possible preferred choices for the principal. This is the richest case in proposition 1 and
corresponds to s < 1/
√
2. Less rich cases follow trivially. Also note that we have assumed
that the condition in lemma 1 (i.e., λπ/w > 3/2) is satisﬁed so that the principal’s choice
is always incentive compatible for the agent. The appendix shows that s < 1/
√
2 and
λπ/w > 3/2 are easy to simultaneously satisfy in general equilibrium. Expected utility
12Data are from iso Central Secretariat (2003).


























, i = p,a . (19)
s enters equation (19) in two ways. From proposition 1, s determines which of three types
of agent involvement in incremental innovation will be adopted in the match. Second, for
a given type of involvement, say type j, utility EU
j
i depends on the costs of debugging
residual incompatibilities i.e., EU
j
i depends on s. The Thai equivalent of equation (19)
replaces F with F∗.
The agents’ problem
Consider equation (19) from the perspective of a Chinese agent. The EU
j
a, j = AU,AA,AM




p into the agent’s expected
utility. Speciﬁcally, plugging equation (7) into equation (6) yields EUAU
a = ws
2P. Plugging




(1+s)(2+s). Plugging equation (15) into




2+s. In order to emphasize the roles of s and the earnings
premium w/λπ, wescalethe EU
j
a andhence EUa bymultiplyingthroughby 4P
λπ. Denoting





















It will also help later to have more compact notation. To this end deﬁne for i = a,p
vi(s,w/π) =

     
     
VAU
i for 0 < s < s(w/π) ,
VAA






2 6 s < 1 .
(21)


































where, from proposition 1, s(w/π) =
2(λ−w/π)
1−2λ+w/π. The Thai equivalent of equation (22)
replaces F with F∗ and w with w∗ to yield Va(w∗/π,F∗).
Inadditiontoproducingautos, bothChinaandThailandproducerice. Riceisproduced
withrawlabour i.e., withoutinnovationeffort ei. Rice productionissubjectto diminishing
returns to labour — think of this as capturing a ﬁxed factor such as land. To avoid
scale effects associated with the ﬁxed factor we assume that China and Thailand are
the same size, each having a workforce of size L. We denote the (endogenous) number
Chinese nationals who choose to become agents in the auto sector by m, so that L − m is
employment in the Chinese rice sector. We choose rice as the numeraire so that its price is
unity. Let wR(L − m) be the marginal product and wage of labour in the rice sector when
L − m workers are employed in the rice sector. By diminishing returns to labour w0
R < 0.
If China produces both rice and autos then its nationals must obtain the same ex-ante
expectedutilitywhethertheyworkinthericesectororareagentsintheautosector. Utility
from working in the rice sector is wR/P. Scaling this by 4P
λπ as we did with the EUa, the




wR(L − m) . (23)




wR(L − m∗) . (24)
These two equations — which state that the agent is indifferent between working in the
auto and rice sectors — are central to our analysis.
24The principals’ problem
Each American principal must employ either a Chinese or Thai agent to produce one unit
of autos. In choosing between locating in China and Thailand, each principal compares
ex ante expected returns of entering each country as given by equation (19). Given that all
blueprints yield the same total proﬁt, from the point of view of principals there are only
two differences between China and Thailand: (a) their distributions F and F∗ and (b) auto
sector wages, w and w∗. Plugging equation (16) into (19), scaling by 4P
(1−λ)π and as before

































The scaling is the same as appeared in equation (17). Graphically, vp is just the upper
envelope in ﬁgure 3 and Vp is the integral over s of this upper envelope. The principal’s
correspondingreturnfromenteringThailandis Vp(w∗/π,F∗). Ifprincipalsoperateinboth
China and Thailand, expected ex-ante returns must be equalized across the two countries:
Vp(w/π,F) = Vp(w∗/π,F∗) . (26)
This equation is also central to our analysis.
A note on general equilibrium
For our main results we will not need to make any additional assumptions about prefer-
ences. Nor will we need to specify market structure or the entry process for principals.
Our main results about the location choices of American principals, local involvement in
incremental innovation, wages and well-being can all be obtained on the basis of equa-
tions (23), (24), and (26) alone. This is surprising because these three equations contain
ﬁve endogenous variables: m, m∗, w, w∗ and π. However, we will not need to know either
proﬁts π or the total number of us principals M = m + m∗. To establish our main results
25we will only need to show two things. First, m > m∗ i.e., we do not need to know about
entry and its impact on the total number of principals M. Second, w/π > w∗/π i.e., we
do not need to know about market structure and its impact on proﬁts π. Thus, equations
(23), (24), and (26) contain just enough information to derive all our main results. We will
introduce more structure on entry, market structure, and proﬁts only for the minor results
of our penultimate section 6.
Wages as an equilibrating mechanism
The wage w paid under agent-uninvolved innovation is the key equilibrating mechanism
in our model. We therefore assume that there is agent-uninvolved innovation in both
countries.13 This simply requires that both countries have positive mass somewhere on
the interval (0,s). However, since s is endogenous we exclude it from the statement of
the assumption by assuming more speciﬁcally that dF(0)/ds > 0 and dF∗(0)/ds > 0 i.e.,
there is mass near s = 0 in both countries. Also, we need ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
to hold strictly in at least one point where it directly matters to the principal i.e., in at
least one point above s. We again exclude the endogenous s from the statement of the
assumption by assuming more speciﬁcally that F 6 F∗ for all s, with strict inequality for
some s ∈ (1/
√
2,1). Note that this last assumption implies that F(1/
√
2) < 1 i.e., some
Chinese agents are involved in agent-managed innovation.
All our results refer to diversiﬁed equilibria, that is, equilibria in which both countries
produce both goods. (See the appendix for a discussion of what is required for this to be
the case.) While this requires Thai agents to produce autos in equilibrium, it says nothing
about whether or not Thai agents are involved in incremental innovation. We can now
state our ﬁrst result about the key equilibrating mechanism w.
Proposition2(Cross-countrywagedifferences) Suppose F FOSD F∗. Theninanydiversiﬁed
equilibrium, auto wages are higher in China than in Thailand, w > w∗.
13See, however, the appendix for an alternative speciﬁcation with no agent-uninvolved innovation and











Notes: AU is agent-uninvolved innovation, AA is agent-assisted innovation and AM is agent-managed innovation.
The solid line is China’s vp(w/π,F) and the dashed line is Thailand’s vp(w∗/π,F∗).
Figure 4. China’s vp(w/π,F) and Thailand’s vp(w∗/π,F∗)
Proof Suppose, contrary to proposition 2, that w 6 w∗. Differentiating equation (25)
yields ∂Vp(w/π,F)/∂w = −F(s(w/π))/[π(1 − λ)].14 By assumption, F places positive
mass in the neighbourhood of s = 0 so that F(s(w/π)) > 0 and ∂Vp(w/π,F)/∂w < 0.
Hence w 6 w∗ implies Vp(w/π,F) > Vp(w∗/π,F). From equations (17) and (21),
vp(s,w∗/π) is a nondecreasing function of s and is strictly increasing on (1/
√
2,1). Since




0 vp(s,w∗/π)dF∗(s) = Vp(w∗/π,F∗). Strict inequality comes
from the fact that by assumption, F < F∗ somewhere on (1/
√
2,1) which means that there
is a subinterval on which both F < F∗ and vp is increasing. Combining Vp(w∗/π,F) >
Vp(w∗/π,F∗) with Vp(w/π,F) > Vp(w∗/π,F) implies Vp(w/π,F) > Vp(w∗/π,F∗), a
violation of equation (26). Hence w > w∗.
14We are using the fact that s(w/π) is deﬁned to satisfy 1−w/π
1−λ =
2(1+s)
2+s . Thus, the derivative of Vp with
respect to s is zero.
27The basic insight is straightforward. Consider ﬁgure 4. It plots the upper envelope
of ﬁgure 3 for China (solid line) and Thailand (dashed line). That is, it plots vp(s,w/π)
and vp(s,w∗/π). Recall that Vp(w/π,F) and Vp(w∗/π,F∗) are integrals over s of these
envelopes. A core feature of the principal’s problem is that the upper envelope is non-
decreasing in s. This reﬂects the fact that the principal prefers working with an agent
whose blueprints create few residual incompatibilities. Since China’s distribution of s ﬁrst
order stochastic dominates Thailand’s, if w = w∗ then each principal prefers China over
Thailand. To ensure that each principal is ex-ante indifferent between locating in these
two countries, lower wages are needed in Thailand to offset the higher expected residual
incompatibilities.
The involvement of Chinese and Thai agents in innovation
We now show that the smaller expected residual incompatibilities created by Chinese
agents imply that a higher fraction of Chinese agents is involved in innovation. More
remarkably, even among agents who create identical residual incompatibilities, Chinese
agents are more involved in incremental innovation than their identical Thai counterparts.
Proposition 3 (General equilibrium involvement in innovation) Suppose F FOSD F∗. Then
in any diversiﬁed equilibrium s(w/π) < s(w∗/π). This implies the following. (1) Consider
a Chinese match and a Thai match that have identical residual incompatibilities or blueprint
similarities s with s(w/π) < s < s(w∗/π). Then only the Chinese agent will be involved in
incremental innovation. The Thai agent will not be. Further, the Chinese agent will be paid more
and have higher utility than the Thai agent. (2) Chinese agents have a higher probability of being
involved in incremental innovation and of managing incremental innovation than Thai agents.
Proof By equation (18), ∂s(w/π)/∂w < 0. Therefore, s(w/π) < s(w∗/π). Consider
part (1). The results about involvement in innovation follow immediately from propos-
ition 1. By the deﬁnition of incentive compatibility, agents always prefer agent-assisted
innovation to agent-uninvolved innovation. Thus, Chinese utility is higher. Further,
lemma 1 implies that λπ > w so that λπ > w∗. That is, the Chinese agent is paid
28more. Consider part (2). By assumption, F places more mass than F∗ does on the interval
(1/
√
2,1) so that Chinese agents have a higher probability of managing innovation. Since
s(w/π) < s(w∗/π), ﬁrst order stochastic dominance implies that F places more mass on
the interval (s(w/π),1) than F∗ places on the interval (s(w∗/π),1). That is, Chinese agents
have a higher probability of being involved in innovation.
Part (1) of proposition 3 and to some extent part (2) operate through the endogenous
general equilibrium wage differences between China and Thailand. Agents performing
basic auto tasks are paid more in China than Thailand so that the additional monetary cost
of including workers in incremental innovation is lower in China. Thus, the minimum
similarity of blueprints required for involvement in innovation is also lower in China:
s(w/π) < s(w∗/π). Therefore, even agents who create identical residual incompatibilities
are more involved in incremental innovation in China than in Thailand. This is a general
equilibrium effect.
The location of American principals
The better distribution of Chinese agents makes China a more attractive location than
Thailand. The better distribution also has a number of other implications. To understand
these, suppose that initially China and Thailand are identical and that we then improve
the Chinese distribution. Start by holding the number of us principals ﬁxed. Then us
principals move from Thailand to China and w rises relative to w∗. This raises the returns
to Chinese agents in the auto sector, leading to a migration of Chinese workers from the
rice to auto sectors. Because of diminishing returns in rice production, this also raises the
Chinese rice wage wR(L − m). Conversely, Thai workers migrate from the auto to rice
sectors, thus depressing Thai rice wages wR(L − m∗). Now allow entry of us principals.
The improvement in the Chinese distribution together with falling wages in Thailand
make both locations more attractive to us principals. This should lead to entry of us
principals, which in turn should reduce proﬁts. The next proposition states that, no
29matter what happens to proﬁts or the total number of us principals (recall that we have
not determined either of these), China must end up with more than half of all principals.
Proposition 4 (Location of American principals) Suppose F FOSD F∗. Then in any diversi-
ﬁed equilibrium, more American principals locate in China than in Thailand, m > m∗.


























0 sdF(s) > 0. By equation (20), the term in brackets is VAU
a − VAA
a evaluated at
s = s. By incentive compatibility, VAU
a 6 VAA
a at s = s. Otherwise, the agent would
turn down the principal’s request to assist in innovation. Hence, the term in brackets
is non-positive. By equation (18), ∂s/∂w < 0. Thus, ∂Va(w/π,F)/∂w > 0. By pro-
position 2, w > w∗ so that Va(w/π,F) > Va(w∗/π,F). From equations (20) and (21),




0 va(s,w∗/π)dF∗(s) = Va(w∗/π,F∗). Combining this inequality




wR(L − m) = Va(w/π,F) > Va(w∗/π,F∗) =
4
λπ
wR(L − m∗). (28)
or
wR(L − m) > wR(L − m∗). (29)
By diminishing returns to labour w0
R < 0. Hence m > m∗.
The basic insight works off the agent’s indifference between the rice and auto sec-
tors. Consider ﬁgure 5 which plots China’s vp(s,w/π) with a solid line and Thailand’s
vp(s,w∗/π) with a dashed line. It is the agent’s counterpart to ﬁgure 4. The proﬁles are
increasing in both countries because agents are always better off when there are fewer











Notes: AU is agent-uninvolved innovation, AA is agent-assisted innovation and AM is agent-managed innovation.
The solid line is China’s va(w/π,F) and the dashed line is Thailand’s va(w∗/π,F∗).
Figure 5. China’s va(w/π,F) and Thailand’s va(w∗/π,F∗)
agent-uninvolved form (w > w∗), the Chinese proﬁle lies above the Thai proﬁle for
s < s(w/π). At s = s(w/π) the proﬁle jumps up because of the incentive compatibility
constraint.15 This raises the Chinese proﬁle even higher above the Thai proﬁle in the
interval s ∈ [s(w/π),s(w∗/π)]. Thus, Chinese agents are better off than Thai agents both
because they have a higher proﬁle and because the Chinese distribution puts more weight
on the higher outcomes to the right. Since an agent’s returns must be equalized across
the rice and auto sectors, Chinese rice wages wR(L − m) must also be higher than Thai
rice wages wR(L − m∗). This is only possible if there are more agents and hence more
American principals in China than in Thailand i.e., m > m∗.
Notice that the principal goes to where agents are most expensive. This result never
occurs in standard product-cycle models where us principals always locate in the lowest-
15Althoughnotobvious, incentivecompatibilityforall s impliesthattheincentivecompatibilityconstraint
is not binding at s = s. In particular, it implies that VAU
a < VAA
a at s = s. See the appendix for details.
31wage country. In our model us ﬁrms take into account wages and the ability of local
agents to participate in incremental innovation. Notice also that to obtain proposition
4 we did not need to make any assumptions about preferences over the different goods
beyond homotheticity. Nor did we need to specify market structure or the entry process
for principals. The above discussion and proof of proposition 4 embodies the next result
which we now make explicit.
Corollary 4.1 (Rice wages and utility) Suppose F FOSD F∗. Then in any diversiﬁed equilib-
rium, wages in the rice sector are higher in China than in Thailand, wR(L − m) > wR(L − m∗),
and utility in both the rice and auto sectors is higher in China than in Thailand.
The ﬁrst part is a re-statement of equation (29). This in turn implies that utility in the
rice sector is higher in China than in Thailand i.e., wR(L−m)/P > wR(L−m∗)/P. Finally,
since agents are indifferent between sectors, utility in the auto sector must also be higher
in China than in Thailand.
This corollary shows that the greater average ability of Chinese agents to assist in
innovation has important welfare consequences. Note that China’s higher income and
welfare are driven by more than just China’s lower average residual incompatibilities.
Open-economy general equilibrium wage adjustments are central. In fact, to use standard
international trade terminology, there is no conditional factor price equalization: agents
who create identical residual incompatibilities can end up uninvolved in innovation in
Thailand, but assisting in innovation and earning a premium in China.
5. The economic consequences of Deng Xiaoping
In January 1992, China’s Deng Xiaoping visited the nascent special economic zone of
Shenzhen as part of his now famous Nanxun or Southern Tour. His purpose was revolu-
tionary — to praise the efﬁciency of capitalist ﬁrms operating in this and similar zones. He
announced the expansion of the export-processing zone program and the liberalization of
the foreign investment regime to allow more foreign companies to operate in China. The
32rest is history. The new regime has led to massive involvement of foreigner entrepren-
eurs in Chinese manufacturing. In this section, to paraphrase Keynes, we examine the
economic consequences of Deng Xiaoping.
Consider a world in which initially all American principals locate in Thailand because
they are not allowed into China. To sharpen the analysis, suppose that the Thai distri-
bution F∗(s) is such that American principals never involve Thai agents in incremental
innovation i.e., all Thai mass is below s(w∗/π). In what follows we state this assumption
simply as F∗(s(w∗/π)) = 1. This corresponds to the ﬁgure 1 ﬁnding that Thai nationals
are almost never listed as co-inventors on American-held patents. Similarly low patent
numbers are also reported for many countries, including Indonesia and the Philippines.
Suppose now that Deng Xiaoping makes his Southern Tour and American principals are
allowed to enter China. As argued above, Chinese agents create fewer expected residual
incompatibilities than Thai agents (F FOSD F∗) so that at least some Chinese agents are
involved in incremental innovation.
Production patterns and trade ﬂows
We start by establishing the pattern of world production. American ﬁrms are only able to
produce if they succeed in creating a blueprint for incremental innovation. Let σ(w/π,F)
denote the expected share of principals locating in China who succeed in developing a
blueprint. Let σ(w∗/π,F∗) be the corresponding success rate for Thailand. The following
proposition shows that investments in Thailand are more likely to end in failure because
local agents are less able to provide support for incremental innovation. Since China has
a larger number of investments and a lower failure rate, China has more auto production
and less rice production than Thailand.
Proposition 5 (Production patterns) Suppose F FOSD F∗ and F∗(s(w∗/π)) = 1 i.e., Thai
agents are not involved in innovation. Then in any diversiﬁed equilibrium, mσ(w/π,F) >
m∗σ(w∗/π,F∗) and L − m∗ > L − m. That is, China produces more autos and less rice than
Thailand.
33Proof By equation (7), an American principal who attempts to develop a blueprint on her
own in the United States succeeds with probability eAU
p = 1/2. A principal who instead
ﬁnds herself working with a particularly capable Chinese agent and asks him to assist in
innovation or to manage innovation succeeds with probability eAA




a + (1 − eAA
a )eAA
p , respectively. By equations (11) and (15), both of these terms exceed
1/2. This is to be expected: when a principal chooses to involve an agent in incremental
innovation it is precisely because the probability of developing a blueprint rises while the




= σ(w∗/π,F∗) . (30)
By proposition 4, m > m∗. Thus, mσ(w/π,F) > m∗σ(w∗/π,F∗) and L − m∗ > L − m.
These production patterns together with identical homothetic preferences imply the
following result about equilibrium trade ﬂows.
Corollary 5.1 (Trade ﬂows) Suppose F FOSD F∗ and F∗(s(w∗/π)) = 1. Then in any
diversiﬁed equilibrium the United States imports more autos from China than from Thailand and
imports more rice from Thailand than from China. The United States ﬁnances this trade deﬁcit
with a capital account surplus against both China and Thailand. This capital account surplus is
comprised of repatriated auto proﬁts from local operations.
Several elements stand out from this analysis. First, we have not completely speciﬁed
all equilibrium trade ﬂows, only the novel parts. For this, once again, we did not need to
make any assumptions about preferences over the different goods beyond homotheticity.
Nor did we need to specify market structure or the entry process for principals. For a
complete speciﬁcation of trade ﬂows, more structure is needed. For example, suppose we
assumethatriceisahomogeneousgoodwithaperfectlycompetitivemarketstructureand
that autos are differentiated goods with a symmetric monopolistic competition market
structure. Then, in addition to what is established in corollary 5.1, China and Thailand
both export autos to each other and China is a net auto exporter to Thailand. Further,
ThailandexportsricebothtotheUnitedStatesandChina. ChinaexportsricetotheUnited
34States only if China is sufﬁciently large relative to the United States. In this case, China
does not import rice from Thailand.
Second, in most international trade models the current account must be balanced. In
fact, the balanced-trade condition is usually a central modelling ingredient that forces
most of the interesting general equilibrium interactions. In contrast, in general equilib-
rium in our model we have China and Thailand running a current account surplus against
the United States and have the United States running a capital account surplus against
China and Thailand. This allows us to deal with a central feature of the international
trading system: there is a huge one-way movement of royalty and innovation-related
business-service payments from developing to developed countries.
From the product cycle to the rise of innovation in low-wage countries
Prior to China’s arrival, our model looks just like a product-cycle model: all innovation
in done in the United States and the production of the standardized good is done in
Thailand. After China’s opening up to American investments, American ﬁrms locating
in Thailand and some of those locating in China continue this product-cycle pattern of
developed-country innovation followed by low-wage standardized production. How-
ever, someAmericanﬁrmsbegininvolvingtheirChineseagentsinincrementalinnovation
and others even delegate to their Chinese agents management of the innovation process.
These were precisely the patterns implied by our patent numbers in ﬁgure 1.
Finally, in our model the distributions F and F∗, summarizing the distribution of likely
residualincompatibilitiesineachcountry, actasasourceofcomparativeadvantage. When
China opens up, the greater average ability of its nationals to assist in innovation makes it
a more attractive location for American auto producers despite relatively higher Chinese
wages.
356. Free Entry and the Flight from Thailand
To model free entry of us principals, suppose that us nationals chose between being
principals in the auto sector and working in an alternative occupation. Given that we
are nearing the end of this paper, we avoid modelling details. Rather than fully modelling
the alternative occupation and providing details about auto-sector market structure and
proﬁts, we make two assumptions that come out of most, if not all, standard models.
We assume that entry of principals into the auto sector lowers proﬁts π and increases
principals’ earnings in their alternative occupation.
Proposition 6 (China’s entry forces the Thai auto sector to contract) Suppose F FOSD F∗
and F∗(s(w∗/π)) = 1. Further suppose that entry of principals lowers π and raises principals’
earnings in their alternative occupation. Then in any diversiﬁed equilibrium, Thailand has fewer
principals m∗ and lower wages in both sectors than before China’s opening up to American
principals.
Proof Initially, Thailand hosts all principals. After China’s opening to American prin-
cipals, by proposition 4, Thailand hosts less than one half of all principals. If the total
number of principals has not increased, Thailand must have fewer principals than before.
We next show that the same result holds even if the total number of principals increases
following China’s opening. By assumption, entry of principals increases their earnings
in the alternative occupation. To reestablish indifference of us nationals between becom-
ing principals and engaging in an alternative occupation, Vp(w∗/π,F∗) must be higher
than before China’s opening. Under our support assumptions on F∗, by equation (25),
Vp(w∗/π,F∗) = 1−w∗/π
1−λ F∗(s(w∗/π)), which is a decreasing function of w∗/π. Recall that
s is decreasing in w∗/π. By assumption, entry of principals lowers auto sector proﬁts π,
so the only way for Vp(w∗/π,F∗) to rise is by having auto wages in Thailand w∗ fall. Let
µ∗ denote the Thai mean of s. Under our support assumptions on F∗, by equations (22)
and (24), the indifference of Thai nationals between becoming principals and working in
the rice sector requires 2w∗µ∗/λπ = 4wR(L − m∗)/λπ or wR(L − m∗) = w∗µ∗/2. Hence
36when Thai auto wages w∗ fall, Thai rice wages wR(L − m∗) must also fall. Since w0
R < 0,
this implies that the number of principals operating in Thailand m∗ is lower after than
before China’s opening.
The appearance of China on the world scene has a negative impact on investment in
Thailand. Notice that the proposition does not state that China’s entry into world markets
reduces Thai welfare. We have not tracked any of the traditional gains from trade so it is
possible that Thailand beneﬁts from China’s entry. Our main point is simply that these
traditional gains from trade for Thailand will be offset, at least in part, by the departure
of American principals from Thailand. This problem is apparent in the Thai and Mexican
patent data of ﬁgure 1 — see the dip after 2001 — and has been commented on by many




markets has been the ability of these countries to deliver shop-ﬂoor incremental innova-
tion to foreign buyers operating complex supply chains. Firms in rich countries need their
suppliers to produce high-quality goods — goods that are reliable, have low failure rates
and incorporate the latest demands of an ever-changing marketplace.
In the old product-cycle view, all innovation, including incremental innovation, is done
in the North. The Northern-designed factory is shipped to the South without any ensuing
technical problems. However, the claim that all innovation is done in the North is no
longer tenable. We provided the ﬁrst systematic evidence on incremental innovation in
low-wage countries using patent data. See ﬁgure 1 in the introduction.
In our view, and that of Sutton (2001), countries have a capacity to deliver a quality
level. If this capacity is above a certain threshold then the country becomes a player in
international trade. In our model there were two thresholds. The ﬁrst, s, demarcated
37matches that involve local agents in innovation from those that do not. The second,
s = 1/
√
2, demarcated matches in which the agent assists in innovation from those in
which the agent manages innovation. This resulted in a model in which the heterogeneity
of matches induced a heterogeneity of incremental innovation across countries and even
within countries.
Differences across countries are due to differences in the distribution of residual incom-
patibilities i.e., due to differences between F and F∗. We argued that relative to Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines and many other low-wage countries, China and India have
better engineers, a more committed diaspora, and a larger domestic market. For Chinese
and Indian engineers, these factors reduce the costs and raise the beneﬁts of making
investments that right-shift F. As a result, the liberalizing of the international trade regime
inChinaandIndialedtoavastinﬂowofforeigninvestmentsintothesecountries. Thishas
led to the growth of increasingly sophisticated, high-quality Chinese and Indian exports.
It has also led to problems for countries such as Thailand and Mexico that were once the
major recipients of Western fdi.
The rise of incremental innovation in some low-wage countries is today a central fact.
Thispaperistheﬁrsttoexplainitsimplicationsforinternationaltrade. Aswehaveshown,
the implications are huge — it’s time to wake up and smell the ginseng.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
The initial contract pays the agent w for starting up a product-cycle relationship i.e, one
with agent-uninvolved innovation. Once the relationship is started up, both parties learn
s. If s islargethentheprincipalofferstoamendthecontracttoallowforagentinvolvement
inincrementalinnovationinexchangeforanearningspremium λπ/w. Theagentcouldin
principle turn down the principal’s offer. We now derive the minimum earnings premium
required for agents to always accept getting involved in innovation when asked to do so
38i.e., a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for incentive compatibility. The agent accepts the
principal’s offer of agent-assisted innovation if and only if VAA
a > VAU
a and the principal’s
offer of agent-managed innovation if and only if VAM
a > VAU
a . By equation (20), VAU
a is a




at s = 0 and are increasing and concave in s. Now look at ﬁgure 5 and imagine increasing
theslope of VAU
a startingfrom 0until itintersects either VAA
a or VAM
a . The ﬁrstintersection
occurs at s = 1 when VAU
a = VAM
a . By equation (20) this implies 2 w
λπs =
2(1+s)
2+s for s = 1 or
equivalently λπ/w = 3/2. This establishes that λπ/w > 3/2 is necessary and sufﬁcient
for VAU
a to be below VAA
a and VAM
a for all s. Equivalently λπ/w > 3/2 is necessary and
sufﬁcient for incentive compatibility to hold for all s.
Parameter restrictions
Our analysis has focused on the richest possible case in which agent-uninvolved, agent-
assisted and agent-managed innovation can all arise for some value of s, incentive com-
patibility is always satisﬁed, and production remains diversiﬁed in both China and Thai-
land. This appendix discusses what is required to ensure this. As shown following
proposition 1, agent-uninvolved, agent-assisted and agent managed innovation are all
possible preferred choices for a principal for some value of s if and only if s < 1 √
2
(where s is given by proposition 1). As shown above in lemma 1, agents always ac-
cept this choice if and only if λπ
w > 3















which simply requires λ < 3
2(2+
√
2) ' 0.44. In addition, we need w








wage w is directly related to the wage in the alternative rice sector wR. Thus, by changing
the endowment of (rice-sector) land we can always shift wR so that w
π lies in the required
interval. Finally, we have also focused on situations in which both China and Thailand
keep some production in the auto and the rice sectors. This is akin to the usual restriction
in trade models of being inside the cone of diversiﬁcation. In our case, it simply requires
39a sufﬁciently high elasticity of the rice-sector wage with respect to employment.
Endogenizing λ
A country with a lower value of λ is more attractive to principals because a principal’s
returns under the agent-assisted and agent-managed forms is (1 − λ)π. If differences
across countries in λ are of interest, we can easily endogenize λ with virtually no extra
work. To this end, assume that λ differs across countries so that we have λ and λ∗. Also
assume that there is never an agent-uninvolved form i.e., that there are only agent-assisted
and agent-managed forms. Then w is no longer part of the model and we can write the








































To obtain principal indifference between markets recall that Vp ≡ 4P
(1−λ)πEUp. Using EUp










































4P or λ > λ∗. In equations (a1)-(a2), ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance implies that the left-hand side is larger in China than Thailand. Hence
4
λπwR(L − m) > 4
λ∗πwR(L − m∗). This together with λ > λ∗ implies wR(L − m) >
wR(L − m∗) or m > m∗. This establishes almost equivalent versions of our two main
propositions 2 and 4: more principals locate in China than in Thailand and earnings λπ
are higher in China than in Thailand.
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